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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 The existing democratization and peacebuilding literature often neglects the important 
role the domestic realm plays in post-conflict peacebuilding.  To explain why some post-conflict 
peacebuilding operations have a greater likelihood of success than others, some scholars have 
examined the impact of factors such as international coordination, external donor interest, 
democratic sequencing, and hostility levels.  This analysis focuses on domestic capacities for 
building peace in the aftermath of civil conflict in order to systematically explore the 
relationship between the domestic sphere and peacebuilding success.  Using Sambanis and 
Doyle’s (2006) peacebuilding triangle model, new local capacities indexes will be created and 
tested.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The contemporary international community is plagued with a proliferation of intrastate 
conflicts or civil wars, most densely located in regions termed “less developed.”  As a result of 
globalization, advanced technology, and the rise of terrorism, the destabilizing effects of 
intrastate war have generated considerable great power interest.  The academic community 
has put forth substantial effort towards understanding and creating peacebuilding initiatives.1  
Sambanis and Doyle’s (2000; 2006) peacebuilding triangle model has become a central theory 
within the existing literature on post-conflict peacebuilding.  Three “concept” variables 
compose the peacebuilding triangle, or the political space available for building peace – 
international capacity, local capacity, and level of hostility, with international capacity 
compensating for lower levels of local capacity and/or higher levels of hostility (Sambanis and 
Doyle 2006).  In contrast to Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) interest in the contribution of UN 
peace operations to post-conflict peacebuilding success, this analysis is focused on exploring 
the relationship between local capacities and peacebuilding success.  The goal of this analysis is 
to show how exploring the dimensions of post-conflict local capacity can shed light on the 
probability of peacebuilding success, in addition to offering insight into an often neglected 
dimension of peacebuilding, the domestic realm. 
 
The purpose of peacebuilding is to address the derivations of hostility and build local capacities 
for non-violent conflict resolution, such as robust state institutions and widespread political 
                                                          
1 Since 1948 there have been 63 UN peace operations, over two thirds of which have been implemented since the 
1990s. 
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participation, during the aftermath of civil strife.  Stated differently, the goal of peacebuilding is 
to endow societies with the skills and mechanisms to prevent future conflicts from turning 
violent.  The phenomena explored in this analysis, namely, local capacity for post-conflict 
peacebuilding, has valuable implications for both academics and policy-makers.  Strengthening 
our understanding of post-conflict local capacity enables the development and implementation 
of successful peacebuilding initiatives.  Furthermore, exploring the facets of post-conflict local 
capacity may offer insight into the current debate concerning the sequencing of institution-
building and democratization by specifying an optimal model for operationalizing local capacity.  
The existing literature on post-conflict peacebuilding generally overlooks or dilutes the 
dynamics of the domestic realm.  This analysis serves to systematically test domestic capacity 
with respect to post-conflict peacebuilding. 
 
Sambanis and Doyle’s (2000; 2006) peacebuilding triangle explores two main local capacities 
models: an index of electricity consumption per capita (the chosen index) and a composite 
index of per capita GDP, rate of growth of per capita GDP, and primary commodity exports as a 
percent of GDP.  The central research question posited in this analysis is how can the local 
capacities index be improved in order to better capture the qualities of the domestic sphere 
and better predict the likelihood of post-conflict peacebuilding success?  How can these 
domestic qualities be systematically tested?  Moreover, what are the factors that influence the 
local capacities level of post-conflict environments?  According to the existing literature, how 
should these factors influence the probability of post-conflict peacebuilding success?  How can 
these factors be operationalized? 
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2. THE PEACEBUILDING TRIANGLE MODEL 
 
Doyle and Sambanis (2000; 2006) identify three core dimensions of international peacebuilding; 
peacebuilding strategies should all address the domestic sources of hostility, the local capacities 
for change, and the extent to which international assistance is available to generate reform.  
The peacebuilding triangle is an embodiment of these three dimensions – level of hostility, local 
capacities, and international capacities – as a model of the effective capacity for building post-
conflict peace.  The dimensions interact with each other allowing the model to be both 
competitive – hostility level versus international and local capacities – and cooperative – 
international capacities and local capacities (Doyle and Sambanis 2000).  The model assumes 
international capacities to be strictly positive following the assumption that international 
assistance will only improve, not thwart, the likelihood of peacebuilding success (Doyle and 
Sambanis 2000).  Each of the three dimensions is measured as an individual index ranging from 
zero to one (see Figure 1). 
 
The logic of the model is straightforward.  As a modern international concept, peacebuilding 
success heavily depends on ample international and/or regional involvement.  Sambanis and 
Doyle (2006) constructed the peacebuilding triangle model for the purpose of deciphering the 
influence of various types of UN peace operations (e.g. mediation missions, observer missions, 
traditional peacekeeping missions, multidimensional peacekeeping missions, and peace 
enforcement missions) during the post-war era.  The hostility level captures the impact of the 
depth of violence present during the civil war – the more pugnacious and numerous the 
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factions – on the need for greater international assistance in order to build peace (Doyle and 
Sambanis 2000).  Accordingly, lower levels of hostility would require less international 
assistance, resulting in a lower-intensity UN mission as the most appropriate option.   The local 
capacities level captures the degree of socioeconomic development present, or the need for 
state reconstruction.  Greater international assistance coincides with a greater need for state 
reconstruction, or a higher-intensity UN mission.  In sum, the aim of Sambanis and Doyle’s 
(2000; 2006) peacebuilding triangle is to show how international assistance is central to 
peacebuilding in general and more likely to be successful when it caters to the context of each 
particular case.   
 
       Figure 1: The Peacebuilding Triangle   
 
 
Although for some cases, such as El Salvador and Croatia, Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) 
peacebuilding model does accurately predict the probability of peacebuilding success, for other 
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cases, the peacebuilding triangle is less accurate due to omitted variables.  Sambanis and Doyle 
(2006) note that the peacebuilding triangle in Congo (1960-1965) could have conceivably been 
more accurate if the primary commodity exports variable captured the country’s high 
dependence on natural resource rents.  On the one hand, the peacebuilding triangle in 
Cambodia (1975-1991) was unable to capture the Khmer Rouge’s principal source of revenue, 
the timber trade.  On the other hand, and equally problematic, the peacebuilding triangle in 
Cyprus (1974) overestimates the country’s resource dependency.  According to Sambanis and 
Doyle (2006), the peacebuilding triangle in East Timor (1975-1999) likely overestimates the 
local capacities level; the insufficient physical infrastructure and absence of human capital 
present in post-conflict East Timor were not captured by the peacebuilding triangle.  In sum, 
the current local capacities index is unable to capture some vital domestic aspects, factors that 
will likely improve the efficacy of the peacebuilding triangle model.    
 
A related concern pertains to the distribution of Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) local capacities 
index.  The mean local capacities level is 0.095, half of the cases have a local capacities measure 
of at or below 0.042, and three-fourths of the cases have a local capacities level of at or below 
0.113.  Although local capacities tend to be low in post-war settings, the lack of variance (0.023) 
in the current local capacities index leaves little room to explore the effect of smaller domestic 
changes on the probability of peacebuilding success.  For instance, all three of Angola’s civil 
wars have a local capacities measure greater than between one-quarter and one half of all of 
the cases, meaning that, according to this index, Angola has greater domestic capacity for 
building peace than over one-fourth to one-half of all post-war intrastate conflicts.  Looking 
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more closely, though, Angola’s domestic terrain is highly problematic for building peace: 
dependency on natural resource rents, lootable resource endowment, religious dominance, 
and no previous experience with political pluralism.  Post-conflict Iraq (1985-1996) also 
measures at a relatively high local capacities level; according to the current local capacities 
index, Iraq had greater domestic capacity for building peace than approximately 90% of all the 
cases.  Adding dimensions to the local capacities index will induce greater variance in the index 
and enable a more fruitful exploration of the effect of the domestic realm with respect to 
building peace. 
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3. LOCAL CAPACITY FOR BUILDING PEACE 
 
Local capacity refers to the domestic resources and aptitude available for building peace in a 
country during the aftermath of civil war (Sambanis and Doyle 2006).  On a basic level, personal 
experience and opportunity shape the contours of the post-conflict terrain.  Kalyvas (2006) 
points out that local quarrels and private grudges often exist but do not usually ignite into 
violence and civil war; determining which factors generate violence and which factors prevent 
war is vital to building sustainable peace.  Sambanis and Doyle (2006) define local capacity as 
the domestic socioeconomic capacity for reform after the cessation of civil conflict: the greater 
the existing level of local capacity, the lesser the need for outside support; the lower the level 
of socioeconomic capacity, the greater the need for an expansive and multidimensional 
international role.  Stated differently, local capacity is a society’s ability to rebuild itself after 
civil strife, taking into account the economic opportunity cost of returning to war (Sambanis 
and Doyle 2006).  When lucrative economic opportunities are accessible, the opportunity cost 
of war goes up, which lowers the incentive for factions to wage war.   
 
Local capacity is not just the domestic capacity for change but also the likelihood of, or capacity 
for, civil conflict.  This analysis conceptualizes local capacity as the need for domestic 
reconstruction (e.g. socioeconomic capital and state infrastructure) as well as the extent to 
which insurgent revenue sources are procurable (e.g. the probability of domestic internecine), 
both of which are contingent on state power.  State power will be included under the 
socioeconomic endowment local capacities dimension.  Additionally, local capacity refers to the 
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existing domestic capacity for democratization; democratization is a fundamental aspect of 
post-conflict peacebuilding.  Although Sambanis and Doyle (2006) take into consideration the 
economic opportunity cost of returning to war, the new conceptualization of local capacity 
includes the broader category of civil war onset, the notion of state power, and propensity for 
democratization, all three of which were not incorporated in Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) 
conceptualization of local capacity.  These three dimensions – extant socioeconomic 
endowment for building peace, capacity for intrastate conflict, and proclivity to 
democratization – coalesce and create the dynamics of local capacity. 
 
Socioeconomic Endowment 
In many ways, state power can be thought of as the epicenter of peacebuilding.  State power, 
or the state’s capacity to broadcast authority across its territory, hinges on several factors: in 
order to reach the rural periphery, states must have ample physical infrastructure (e.g. roads, 
electricity lines, telephone or communication lines, etc.); building physical infrastructure 
requires money; generating revenue predominantly depends on taxation (excluding the 
theories on natural resource endowment and taxation); taxation tends to parallel greater 
political accountability, which commonly corresponds with enhanced social services and a 
better educated citizenry.  Collier and Hoeffler (2004) reveal a significant relationship affixing 
population dispersion and conflict risk, reflecting Herbst’s (2000) hypothesis postulating that 
states with highly dispersed populations are less able to control its people and states with 
condensed populations are more able to control its people.   Serwer and Thomson (2007) 
define state infrastructure as electricity, communications, and transportation, such as roads, 
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railways, or telephone landlines.   In a study examining the factors that influence the likelihood 
of successful implementation of intrastate peace agreements, Stedman (2001) includes a 
qualitative measure of collapsed state defined as the absence of state institutions and 
capacity.2  Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that conditions that favor insurgency significantly 
influence intrastate conflict risk.  Central to this argument is the hypothesis that insurgents are 
more likely to survive and flourish in environments where the state is weak, referring to the 
state’s police and military capabilities, in addition to the broadcast of state institutions, do not 
reach the rural domain (Fearon and Laitin 2003).3  Conditions that favor insurgency pertain to 
the presence of rough terrain (lack of functional/paved roads), large rural populations, etc.  This 
analysis will use two proxies of state power – rural population density and percent urban 
population – and will include state power as part of the socioeconomic local capacities 
dimension.  Although road density, communications density, or army size could also be 
insightful proxies for state power, the current paucity of data prohibits their usage in this 
analysis.4 
 
Numerous arguments concerning socioeconomic capital and domestic internecine have been 
adduced by academics.  Both Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that 
countries with high levels of per capita income and high levels of per capita income growth are 
both significantly associated with a reduction in conflict risk.  Collier and Hoeffler (2004) attest 
                                                          
2 Stedman (2001) includes collapsed state as one of eight factors that make peacebuilding difficult; the more 
difficulty factors present, the more onerous peace implementation will be.  Also, Stedman (2001) does not specify 
precisely what defines state institutions and capacity. 
3 Insurgents refer to small groups of lightly armed combatants that use guerrilla warfare from rural bases (Fearon 
and Laitin 2003). 
4 Road density or telephone landline density would be useful if they could be measured at the end year of each 
conflict. 
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that a higher level of economic development makes countries less conducive to rebellion.  
Additionally, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) operationalize socioeconomic development with a 
measure of male secondary education enrollment, which also proves to be highly significant.  
For Fearon and Laitin (2003), economic development reduces conflict risk because more 
developed countries have stronger states, and are therefore likely to have more state 
infrastructure that extends state power to the rural periphery.  In Walter’s (2004) study 
exploring the factors that influence the recurrence of intrastate conflict she finds that the 
current living conditions in a country is highly associated with the probability of civil war 
recurrence.  Using infant mortality, life expectancy, and adult literacy individually in addition to 
a composite index of all three factors, Walter (2004) argues that poor living conditions 
influence the risk of conflict because of the effect living conditions have on an individual’s 
propensity to enlist, or re-enlist, with rebel organizations.  Although male secondary education 
enrollment, life expectancy, infant mortality, and adult literacy do serve as acceptable proxies 
for socioeconomic development, they are less appropriate for measuring socioeconomic capital 
with respect to state power.5  Pivotal to successful peacebuilding is monopolizing the legitimate 
use of force – without basic physical security, sustainable peace is highly improbable.  This 
analysis chooses electricity consumption per capita as the most appropriate proxy for 
socioeconomic capital and physical infrastructure; GDP per capita will be used to check model 
robustness. 
 
                                                          
5Sambanis and Doyle (2006) argue that life expectancy, infant mortality, and adult literacy are less theoretically 
tied to incentives for waging war. 
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In sum, two critical factors encompass the socioeconomic local capacities dimension for 
building peace, or for state reconstruction: broadcast of state power and socioeconomic 
capital.  Theoretically, internal domestic threats are less likely to succeed in waging war when a 
state is able to broadcast power to its borders, just as people are less likely to wage war when 
their basic needs are met.  The modern state system favors external sovereignty, as opposed to 
internal sovereignty, with control of the capital city corresponding to internationally recognized 
leadership of a country.  Consequently, the system encourages state echelons to focus on 
controlling the capital city and its immediate surrounding areas, instead of controlling the rural 
terrain.  State power will be operationalized as rural population density and as the percentage 
of the total population that is urban.6  The direction of the relationship between rural 
population density or percent urban population and peacebuilding success is ambiguous.  On 
one hand, greater rural population density could mean a larger population residing outside 
state power because the rural periphery is further away from the urban capital.  On the other 
hand, greater rural population density could mean that the rural population is less scattered 
thereby making the rural terrain more conducive to consolidating state power.  Any large 
country with non-contiguous areas of high population density is likely to have low levels of 
state power.7  For instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo is a prime example of a “rim-
land” country, or a country where the high population concentrations are located in border 
regions while the interior is relatively empty (Herbst 2000).  State power as percent urban 
                                                          
6 In most cases of intrastate conflict the state itself is part of the problem.  For the purposes of this analysis, 
greater state power is expected to have a positive relationship with building peace because it corresponds to a 
greater degree of extant physical infrastructure.  More physical infrastructure coincides with less of a need for 
infrastructure building, which corresponds with a greater chance for successfully building peace.   
7 Benin is an example of a country with favorable population dispersion: a small country with the highest 
concentration of power found in one area, located around the capital city, with population densities diminishing as 
the distance from the capital increases (Herbst 2000). 
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population could also be argued both ways.  Greater percent urban population could mean that 
a larger percentage of the population is within the boundaries of state power because more 
people are residing in the urban capital.  Alternatively, greater percent urban population could 
mean that the rural domain is unsafe or unable to sustain populations.  If people reside in 
urban conglomerates because they are unable to receive their basic needs in the rural domain, 
then greater percent urban population would mean less state power.  Socioeconomic capital 
refers to whether or not the state is able to provide its population with basic needs – e.g. 
water, food, shelter, and basic physical security – which largely depends on physical 
infrastructure.  Electricity consumption per capita will serve as the proxy for socioeconomic 
capital.8 
 
Probability of Intrastate Conflict 
Many scholars have emphasized the impact natural resources have on the probability of 
intrastate war onset (Collier 2007; Fearon and Laitin 2003; 2007).  Theoretically, factors that 
influence the risk of intrastate conflict should also influence the probability of post-conflict 
peacebuilding success.  Specifically, two central arguments have been made.  First, Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) attest that natural resources influence conflict risk because they provide rebel 
groups with the financial opportunities which make rebellion feasible, if not desirable.  In the 
absence of natural resources, spoilers generally procure funding via Diaspora donations or aid 
from other governments (Bigombe et al 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  For instance, the 
Renamo rebellion in Mozambique was primarily funded by the government of Southern 
                                                          
8 Electricity consumption per capita is highly correlated with income in addition to presupposing sufficient physical 
infrastructure (Sambanis and Doyle 2006). 
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Rhodesia, or present day Zimbabwe (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  Countries with substantial 
American Diaspora have a 36% risk of conflict, in comparison to countries with small Diaspora 
populations having a 6% chance of conflict (Collier 2000).  The involvement of the Tamil 
diaspora in the Sri Lankan insurgency highlights the immense impact Diaspora can have on 
intrastate conflict.  The Tamil diaspora played a pivotal role in encouraging the LTTE to enter a 
ceasefire with Colombo (Fair 2005).  Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that the peak risk of 
conflict is associated with countries that have 33% primary commodity exports (as percent of 
GDP); the significance of primary commodity exports holds even when categorized according to 
which type of product was dominant.  Moreover, Collier (2007) finds that the most precarious 
level of primary commodity dependence is 26%, which is associated with a 23% greater risk of 
conflict.  Opposing Collier (2007) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon (2005) argues that the 
influence of primary commodity dependence on civil war risk is attributed to oil: oil is a major 
source of primary commodity dependence and significant oil production increases conflict risk.  
For example, the internal conflicts in Angola, the second largest sub-Saharan oil producer and 
the fourth largest world diamond producer by value, were funded via both diamonds and oil, 
with the MPLA controlling oil and UNITA controlling diamonds (Le Billon 2001).  Second, 
scholars argue that natural resources weaken state institutions (e.g. less need for taxation, 
therefore less political accountability) which increases the risk of conflict (Fearon and Laitin 
2003; Snyder and Bhavnani 2005).  Fearon and Laitin (2004) find that greater oil exports do 
increase conflict risk.  This analysis will test all of these proxies for insurgent funding sources: 
natural resource dependency, Diaspora size, and oil dependency.       
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There are a broad array of existing theories pertaining to ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
fragmentation and domestic internecine.  According to Collier (2000), ethnic dominance – when 
one ethnic group comprises between 45% and 90% of the total population – doubles the risk of 
domestic conflict.  An ethnic group constituting 45% of a total state population is likely to have 
a stable winning coalition even in a democracy (Bigombe et al 2000).  Other than ethnic 
dominance, more ethnically and religiously heterogeneous societies are significantly less likely 
to exhibit intrastate war; ethnically and religiously homogenous societies have a conflict risk of 
23% in comparison to the 3% for highly diverse societies (Collier 2000).  Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) explore the hypothesis that ethnic fractionalization should be especially influential in 
determining the probability of conflict in the presence of higher per capita income.  This 
hypothesis stems from modernist theories: new economic opportunity structures spawned 
from economic growth can be problematic in ethnically or religiously fragmented societies 
because access to these new economic opportunities will likely follow existing ethnic or 
religious cleavages.  For example, the Rwandan civil war was fought between the Hutu majority 
and the Tutsi minority, which resulted in genocide.9  Reynal-Querol (2002) argues that religious 
fractionalization is more problematic than ethnic or linguistic fragmentation because religious 
identities are especially fixed and nonnegotiable.  Furthermore, the type of political system (e.g. 
consociational democracy) and level of democracy affect the probability of ethnic civil war 
(Reynal-Querol 2002).  Ross (2003) suspects a relationship between separatist conflicts and 
unlootable resources as well as nonseparatist conflicts and lootable resources – lootable 
                                                          
9 It is important to note how emigration sometimes changes ethnic dominance, as was the case in the former 
Yugoslavia.  Yugoslavia gradually transformed from having no one group constituting as much as 45% of the total 
population into a series of independent countries, each exhibiting ethnic dominance (Bigombe et al 2000). 
15 
 
resources are more likely to benefit a rebel group and unlootable resources are more likely to 
benefit the government.10  This analysis will proxy ethnoreligious topography with following 
variables: an ethnolinguistic fractionalization index, a religious fractionalization index, a binary 
measure of ethnic dominance, and a binary measure of religious dominance. 
 
In sum, the second local capacities dimension, probability of civil war, encompasses two central 
facets: conflict means and ethnoreligious topography.  Insurgents first require the cost of using 
violence to be low in comparison to the anticipated gains in order to bolster enlistment, and 
second, insurgents require the financial vitality to wage war.  There are three main categories 
of insurgent funding sources: natural resource extortion, assistance from Diasporas, or 
subventions from hostile governments (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  Natural resource extortion 
will be proxied by primary commodity exports as a percent of GDP (e.g. natural resource 
dependency) and by a binary measure of oil dependency (e.g. one-third or more of total 
exports derived from oil).  Diaspora assistance will be proxied by the number of emigrants living 
in the US as a proportion of the total population in the country of origin.11   Greater natural 
resource dependency, oil dependency, and Diaspora size should correspond with a greater risk 
of conflict.  Also relevant are the presence of lootable resources,12 defined as natural resources 
easily attainable by individuals or small groups of unskilled workers, especially when rural 
population density is high; larger populations existing outside state power with access to 
lucrative resources coincides with a greater probability of civil war outbreak.  For example, the 
                                                          
10 This could be measured by the interaction of the war type variable and the lootable resources variable. 
11 A Cold War dummy variable is already included in Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) analysis as a control variable. 
12 e.g. gems, opium, diamonds, timber, cocoa, iron, palm oil, coffee, marijuana, rubber (as opposed to unlootable 
resources, e.g. oil, natural gas, copper, gold) 
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heavy diamond endowment of the Kono District in Sierra Leone funded the insurgencies during 
both civil wars (Zach-Williams 1999).  Lootable resources will be proxied by a dichotomous 
variable measuring whether or not a country is endowed with diamonds and will also be 
interacted with a measure of rural population density.13  The purpose of the interaction variable 
is to intensify the importance of rural population density when coinciding with lootable 
resources.  Ethnic, linguistic, or religious fragmentation should only be problematic when ethnic 
dominance is present; otherwise, ethnic or religious heterogeneity should correspond with 
societies less susceptible to civil strife.  Ethnoreligious fragmentation will be proxied by an 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization index and a religious fractionalization index; higher 
ethnoreligious fragmentation should coincide with a lower risk of conflict.  Furthermore, 
ethnoreligious dominance will be proxied by two binary variables, with one corresponding to 
countries with one ethnic group, or one religious group, constituting between 45% and 90% of 
the total population.  Ethnic and religious dominance should coincide with an increase in 
conflict risk. 
 
Propensity for Democratization 
Post-conflict environments favorable to democratization should correlate with a greater 
probability of peacebuilding success because democratization is an inherent element of 
peacebuilding.  In an influential analysis exploring the relationship between democracy and 
development, Przeworski et al (2000) show how democratic regimes are unstable in countries 
with a low level of economic development and stable in affluent environments.  Moreover, the 
                                                          
13 Diamond endowment refers to primary and secondary diamond production. 
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democratic peace thesis argues that democratic states are unlikely to go to war with each 
other, yet transitioning democracies are more likely to go to war than non-democratic states 
(Doyle 1997).  There is strong consensus in the contemporary international community that 
post-conflict peacebuilding operations must favor political openness or democratic principles.  
Accepting this norm, scholars argue that a country that has had some previous experience with 
democracy is more conducive to democratization (Carothers 2007; Sambanis and Doyle 2006; 
Paris 2004; Serwer and Thomson 2007).  Post-conflict Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and Israel all 
exhibited considerable previous experience with political pluralism, and all established either a 
post-war republic or a parliamentary democracy.  Walter’s (2004) analysis concerning the 
determinants of renewed intrastate war includes three proxies for political openness including 
an overall democracy/autocracy scale, a measure of executive constraints on the executive 
branch, and a measure of political openness.  Alternatively, in Hartzell’s et al (2001) study of 
civil war settlement stability, a dichotomous measure of previous regime type was used to 
proxy democratic experience.  Although executive constraints and political openness are 
important measures of democratic quality, they are less related to the exposure of the citizenry 
to political participation and democratic ideals.  This analysis conceptualizes domestic capacity 
for democratization – the third and final local capacities dimension – in terms of basic 
democratic exposure, which will be proxied by the following: a pre-war five year average 
democracy score (e.g. Vanhanen democracy index) and a political participation score (e.g. 
Vanhanen).14  This analysis chose the Vanhanen Democracy Index over a Polity score (e.g. 
democracy/autocracy scale) or a dichotomous measure of previous regime type because 
                                                          
14 A measure of political participation is one of the elements of the Vanhanen Democracy Index; the other factor is 
a measure of political competition. 
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propensity for democratization is conceptualized as previous experience with democracy, 
which has less to do with measuring how autocratic a regime is.  Furthermore, including a 
measure of political participation is beneficial because it focuses on mass-level political 
exposure.  A higher democracy or political participation score should correspond with a greater 
probability of peacebuilding success.15 
 
Social Capital 
Many scholars have theorized an additional local capacities dimension, social capital.  
Fukuyama (2002) points out that social capital is essential to economic development and 
democratic consolidation, both of which are factors that influence the likelihood of post-
conflict peacebuilding success.  As a concept, social capital generally refers to densely 
embedded networks of relationships between individuals and groups (Onyx and Bullen 2000; 
Portes 1998; Putnam 1993; Woolcock 1998).  Putnam’s (1993) study exploring the relationship 
between social capital and government performance highlights the distinction between 
horizontal relationships and vertical relationships.  Paxton (2002) emphasizes the importance of 
distinguishing between different forms of social capital (e.g. bridging and bonding), both 
negative and positive, and the effects they have on transitioning democracies and consolidated 
democracies.  The first measure of social capital Paxton (2002) employed was an index of two 
variables – the density of associations in each county and the level of generalized trust present 
– both of which were determined using survey data.  Association density was operationalized as 
the average number of voluntary association memberships and the average number of 
                                                          
15 A pre-war five year Polity score average and a dichotomous variable of previous regime type (with one equating 
a Polity score of greater than five) will also be tested to check model robustness. 
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voluntary association memberships for which the member did unpaid voluntary work during 
the past year (Paxton 2002).  Paxton’s (2002) second measure of social capital was the number 
of international nongovernmental organizations present in each country.  Alternatively, 
scholars have measured social capital as the heterogeneity of memberships in associations 
(Coffe and Geys 2007; Woolcock and Narayan 2000).  In addition to treating social capital as an 
independent variable, scholars have conceptualized social capital as a product of its 
institutional environment (Collier and Gunning 1999; Knack and Keefer 1997; North 1990).  
Knack and Keefer (1997) measure social capital as a combination of the level of trust in a 
society and the strength of norms of civic cooperation, both of which were obtained via 
individual survey data. 
 
Although scholars have increasingly taken an interest in conceptualizing social capital with 
respect to peacebuilding, the existing literature still lacks any sufficient operationalization of 
social capital.  The aforementioned social capital proxies – association density and 
heterogeneity of association membership – have been generated via individual level survey 
data; the kind of survey data required for this analysis is not currently available.  Furthermore, 
measuring social capital as the number of INGOs present in each country also requires data that 
does not currently exist.  Consequently, social capital will not be explored as a local capacities 
dimension in this analysis.  If future studies could generate a consistent and reliable country-
level measure of association membership heterogeneity throughout the post-war era, this 
dimension could plausibly be included in the local capacity index. 
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Sambanis and Doyle (2001; 2006) were predominantly concerned with exploring the 
contribution of UN peace operations to post-war peacebuilding success.  Alternatively, this 
analysis is focused on the relationship between a country’s local capacities level and the 
probability of post-conflict peacebuilding success.  The aim of this analysis is to show how 
adding depth to post-conflict local capacity can offer important insight into the likelihood of 
peacebuilding success in addition to the broader relationship between domestic politics and 
peace. 
 
Using the same international capacities index and hostility index as Sambanis and Doyle (2006), 
several new local capacities indexes will be constructed and evaluated within the peacebuilding 
triangle model.  The new indexes will be weighted so that each country is measured in relation 
to all of the other countries included in the analysis, which parallels Sambanis and Doyle’s 
(2006) model.  First, multiple logistic regression models with robust standard errors and 
clustered same-country observations will be tested using the new local capacity variables.16  
Furthermore, models will also be tested excluding each individual local capacities dimension, 
one at a time, in order to offer insight into the contribution of each specific dimension.    
 
The best models will be transformed into local capacities indexes, each ranging from zero to 
one.  Next, logistic regression models, with robust standard errors and clustered by country, of 
                                                          
16 This analysis tests a dichotomous dependent variable – peacebuilding success – using balanced data; therefore a 
logistic regression model is most appropriate. 
21 
 
the new local capacities indexes, and Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) international capacities 
index and hostility index, will be tested to determine if the new local capacities indexes improve 
the efficacy of the peacebuilding triangle model.   
 
 
 
Finally, several specific peacebuilding triangles will be measured and compared to Sambanis 
and Doyle’s (2006) model as an additional check for model robustness. 
 
The Data 
This analysis utilizes a cross-sectional dataset comprised of 119 intrastate conflicts, spanning 
the time period between 1945 and 1999, including 66 countries.17  Of the 66 countries, 6 are in 
Europe,18 11 are in Latin America,19 16 are in the Middle Eastern and North African region,20 13 
are in Asia,21 and 20 are in sub-Saharan Africa.22  Following Sambanis and Doyle (2000; 2006), 
                                                          
17 Following Sambanis and Doyle (2006), a total of 151 conflicts are included in the dataset, however, only 119 
conflicts are measured for peacebuilding success.  All wars that were ongoing at the cutoff date (e.g. December 31, 
1999) or wars that showed no significant peace process prior to the cutoff date were excluded from the analysis 
(Sambanis and Doyle 2006).   
18 Most of the European countries – including Moldova, Croatia, Russia, the former Yugoslavia, and Greece – 
exhibit one domestic conflict; however, Cyprus has two conflicts included in the dataset. 
19 Of the Latin American countries, 7 (i.e. Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Peru, Cuba, Bolivia, and 
Paraguay) countries had one intrastate conflict and 4 countries (i.e. Argentina, Guatemala, Colombia, and 
Nicaragua) exhibited two civil wars. 
20 Morocoo/Western Sahara, Egypt, Israel, Syria, Azerbaijan, Yemen PR, Oman, Jordan, Algeria, and Yemen all had 
one intrastate conflict included in the dataset.  Additionally, Georgia, Iran, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Yemen AR 
each had two wars; lastly, Iraq exhibited 5 civil wars.  
21 Of the 13 countries in Asia, 5 (i.e. Vietnam, Bangladesh, Laos, Thailand, and Korea) countries displayed one 
conflict, 2 countries (i.e. Cambodia and Pakistan) had two wars, 4 countries (i.e. Sri Lanka, Myanmar/Burma, India, 
and the Philippines) exhibited three conflicts each, and 2 countries (i.e. Indonesia and China) each displayed five 
civil wars.    
22 Sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the most post-war civil conflicts, with Congo-Brazzaville, South Africa, 
Djibouti, Namibia, Mozambique, and Mali all having one civil war; Somalia, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, Sudan, and Liberia exhibiting two conflicts each; Rwanda, Angola, Chad, Burundi, and Ethiopia displaying 
three intrastate wars; and Uganda and Congo-Zaire exhibiting four civil conflicts each. 
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an armed conflict is classified as a civil war if: the conflict takes place within the territorial 
bounds of an internationally recognized state consisting of a population of at least 500,000, the 
warring parties have publicly stated political objectives and are both politically and militarily 
organized, the internationally recognized government is one of the warring parties via the use 
of its military or militias, the insurgencies have a local base (e.g. they must recruit from the local 
population), the war accumulates more than 1,000 deaths in a least a single year, the 
insurgencies are able to mount effective resistance against the government (i.e. the weaker 
party has to inflict a minimum of 100 deaths on the stronger party), and the war duration 
exhibits sustained violence.23       
 
The Dependent Variable 
Sambanis and Doyle (2000; 2006) use two measures of peacebuilding success in their analysis: a 
measure of “negative” peace and a measure of “positive” peace.  “Negative,” otherwise termed 
“sovereign” peace, is primarily concerned with the absence of large-scale violence, and requires 
the war to have ended, the existence of undivided sovereignty, the absence of substantial 
residual violence, as well as the absence of state-committed mass-level human rights abuses.24  
The second operationalization of peacebuilding success is “positive” or “participatory” peace.  
“Participatory” peace is defined as “sovereign” peace with the additional requirement of a 
minimal level of political openness.25  Both dependent variables are measured two years after 
                                                          
23 Sustained violence means that for any given three year period, a minimum of 500 battle-related deaths must 
have occurred (Sambanis and Doyle 2006). 
24 The dataset includes 68 “sovereign” peace failures and 53 successes.  Residual violence corresponds to 
approximately 200 annual deaths (Sambanis and Doyle 2006). 
25 A total of 37 cases were classified as having attained “participatory” peace; the remaining 84 cases were coded 
“participatory” failures.  Sambanis and Doyle (2006) employ a polity threshold of 3 or below for coding a minimal 
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the cessation of war.26  Although two years is an arbitrary cutoff, employing a two year 
threshold allows this analysis to compare its results to that of Sambanis and Doyle (2006).  
Moreover, this analysis defines peacebuilding success in terms of the absence of large-scale 
violence and a minimal level of political openness thereby focusing on physical security.  
Establishing basic physical security is of the utmost importance at the onset of peacebuilding; 
without physical security, long-term peacebuilding efforts will likely fail.  This analysis will focus 
on “participatory” peace. 
 
The Explanatory Variables 
This analysis replicates Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) chosen hostility and international 
capacities indexes (see Appendix A).  All of the indexes utilized in this analysis will be 
constructed vis-à-vis all of the countries included in the dataset.  The hostility index includes a 
measure of war type, which is a binary variable distinguishing between ethnoreligious wars and 
non-ethnoreligious wars (H1),
27 a measure of the human cost of war, or the natural log of the 
total number of deaths and displacements accumulated by the conflict (H2), and a measure of 
war duration (H3).  In sum, ethnoreligious wars, conflicts generating greater human cost, and 
wars that span shorter periods of time, should correspond with high levels of post-conflict 
hostility.  Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) chosen international capacity index includes an 
interaction variable: the type of UN mission (I1) multiplied by whether or not a peace treaty was 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
level of political openness; the polity score ranges from 0 to 20, with maximum democracy corresponding to 20 
and extreme autocracy coinciding with 0. 
26 Doyle and Sambanis (2006) also measure “sovereign” and “participatory” peace with a 5-year threshold.  For 
more extensive coding and classification details, see Sambanis and Doyle (2006). 
27 A total of 97 conflicts were classified as an ethnoreligious war. 
24 
 
signed (I2).
28  UN mandates were coded 0 through 5 according to mission intensity: no UN 
mandate corresponds with 0, mediation mandates equate 1, observer missions are denoted by 
2, 3 represents tradition peace keeping operations, 4 signifies multidimensional peace keeping 
operations, and enforcement missions equate 5.29  Peace treaty is measured as a dichotomous 
variable with 1 signifying the presence of a signed peace treaty.30 
 
All of the new local capacities indexes will include the following variables (see Appendix B): 
electricity consumption per capita (L1),
31 Diaspora size as percent US (L2),
32 ethnic dominance 
(L3), and religious dominance (L4) (e.g. one group equating between 45% and 90% of the total 
state population).33  The two state power proxies - rural population density (L5a) and percent 
urban population (L5b) – will be tested in alternate models.  The following pairs of variables will 
also be alternated between models: primary commodity exports as percent GDP (L6a) and oil 
dependency (L6b); Vanhanen democracy score (L7a) and political participation score (L7b).  Ethnic 
fractionalization (L8) and religious fractionalization (L9) will be tested individually in addition to 
each being interacted with per capita electricity consumption.  Moreover, lootable resource 
endowment (L10) will be tested independently and interacted with rural population density.  
Ethnic and religious dominance will also both be interacted with Diaspora size.  The models 
                                                          
28 It may also be useful to construct alternative international capacities indexes that include a measure of non-UN 
peace missions and a measure of UN troop intensity – Sambanis and Doyle (2006) already have these variables in 
their dataset.  A new variable measuring all peace missions could be constructed; non-UN peace missions could be 
classified as having the same level of intensity as a UN mediation mission (intensity=1). 
29 The breakdown of UN mandates measured in the dataset is as follows: 107 conflicts without UN mandates, 10 
mediation missions (4 with signed peace treaties), 13 observer missions (8 with signed peace treaties), 8 traditional 
peace keeping operations (5 with signed peace treaties), 7 multidimensional peace keeping operations (7 with 
signed peace treaties), and 6 enforcement missions (3 with signed peace treaties). 
30 The dataset includes 102 conflicts without signed peace treaties and 45 conflicts with signed peace treaties. 
31 The measure of electricity consumption per capita is rescaled, or divided by 100. 
32 Diaspora size is rescaled, or divided by 1,000. 
33 GDP per capita will be tested in place of electricity consumption per capita to check model robustness. 
25 
 
with rural population density will also test an interaction between rural population density and 
electricity consumption per capita and the urban population models will include an interaction 
between percent urban population and electricity consumption per capita.  Additionally, local 
capacities indexes will be constructed excluding each of the individual local capacities 
dimensions, one at a time.  Models will be tested with these local capacities indexes in order to 
shed light on the importance of each specific local capacities dimension. 
 
The following control variables will be included in this analysis: a binary variable measuring 
whether or not the war is classified as a Cold War conflict controlling for systemic constraints 
(C1) , a dummy measure controlling for sub-Saharan Africa (C2), and a variable measuring the 
per capita size of the country’s military at the end of the war (C3).  Conventional wisdom holds 
that securing basic physical security is of the utmost importance during the initial peacebuilding 
phases.  Adequate DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of ex-combatants) is 
essential to providing basic physical security; the measure of military personnel (in thousands) 
is a proxy for the difficulty associated with establishing basic physical security.   Furthermore, 
the greater the number of military personnel present, the greater the government’s capacity to 
deter any third party intervention.  
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5. HYPOTHESES 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1.  The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should be greater in 
post-conflict environments displaying more physical infrastructure, or a greater degree 
of state power. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2.  The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should increase in 
contexts exhibiting greater levels of socioeconomic development. 
 
On a basic level, if a state is unable to project power to its periphery and is unable to provide 
basic physical needs to its people, then the state is at high risk of intrastate conflict (Ball 2001; 
Herbst 2000; Rotberg 2007).  Populations that live outside the realm of state power are unlikely 
to receive state resources and are not subjected to the laws of the state.  The larger these 
populations are, the more equipped they are to wage war against the state.  Take, for instance, 
the Ethiopian civil war that led to the independence of Eritrea in 1993.  One reason why Addis 
Ababa was unable to control the civil war was the country’s scattered population dispersion 
(Herbst 2000).  Furthermore, scholars show how economic grievance – a common characteristic 
of impoverished states – can easily erupt into civil war.  Countries with more developed 
economies are therefore less susceptible to civil war in addition to being better equipped to 
rebuild after war.  The higher the level of economic development, the more prepared a country 
is to rebuild after civil conflict, and the less susceptible the country is to wars developing from 
economic grievance.      
 
HYPOTHESIS 3.  The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should decrease when a 
country is more dependent on natural resource rents. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4.  The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should decrease when a 
country has significant Diaspora populations. 
27 
 
HYPOTHESIS 5.  The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should decrease when a 
country is endowed with lootable resources. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 6.  The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should decrease when a 
country has a higher rural population density while simultaneously being endowed 
with lootable resources. 
 
Civil wars cannot be waged without revenue sources.  Insurgents generally secure their 
financial vitality via natural resource extortion, donations from Diasporas, or subventions from 
other governments.  The Sikh diaspora enabled the Khalistan insurgency, the Kono District 
fueled the rebels in Sierra Leone, and Renamo was primed by the government of Southern 
Rhodesia.  Lootable resources are particularly easy to extort, which is why having larger 
populations able to access lootable resources is especially daunting.  Additionally, natural 
resource dependence tends to coincide with undiversified economies, and undiversified 
economies are particularly sensitive to commodity price shocks and tend to lack substantial 
manufacturing and service sectors that cultivate human capital and stimulate economic growth 
(Sambanis and Doyle 2006). 
 
HYPOTHESIS 7.  The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should increase with 
greater ethnic or religious fractionalization. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 8. The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should decrease when a 
country exhibits ethnic or religious fractionalization and increasing socioeconomic 
capital. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 9.  The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should decrease with 
ethnic or religious dominance. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 10.  The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should decrease with 
ethnic or religious dominance and greater Diaspora populations. 
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From a conflict resolution perspective, more groups make determining settlement terms a 
more arduous task, assuming that ethnic groups generally have a set of shared preferences.  
Ethnic and religious heterogeneity should be even more influential with respect to the 
probability of conflict in environments with higher levels of socioeconomic development.  
Additionally, ethnic or religious dominance should increase the likelihood of conflict, thereby 
decreasing the probability of peacebuilding success.  Larger Diaspora populations are especially 
problematic in the presence of ethnic or religious dominance, as the Sri Lankan civil war 
emphasizes. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 11.  The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should be greater when 
a country has had some previous experience with political pluralism. 
 
The existing literature on democratization emphasizes previous experience with political 
pluralism as favoring democratization.  Societies previously exposed to democratic institutions 
and ideals are likely to require less democratic education and should therefore be more 
conducive to democratization.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 12.  The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should decrease when a 
conflict has accumulated greater war-related deaths and displacements. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 13.  The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should increase when a 
conflict has greater war duration. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 14.  The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should decrease with 
ethnic or religious based wars. 
 
The greater the human costs of war, the less social and human capital available, thereby 
creating a society ill-equipped to rebound after civil conflict.  Additionally, the greater the 
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human costs of war, the greater the social-psychological damage is which is an impediment 
to successful peacebuilding.  Scholars have argued both directions for war duration.  
Theoretically, longer wars generally accumulate more deaths and displacements thereby 
increasing the level of hostility.  However, warring factions also grow tired of fighting as war 
duration increases thereby making peace more likely.  In concordance with Doyle and 
Sambanis (2001), this analysis hypothesizes that war duration will have a positive 
relationship with peacebuilding success.  Ethnic and religious cleavages can easily be used 
as mediums for channeling hostility, which in turn, can mobilize support for identity-based 
wars.  Additionally, ethnic or religious wars generally make reconciliation more difficult.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 15.  The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should increase when a 
war ends with a signed peace treaty. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 16.  The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should increase with 
greater UN involvement in the form of UN peace operations. 
 
Peace treaties represent the willingness of warring factions to agree to end the use of violence 
and begin to pursue non-violent mechanisms to achieve their desires.  Therefore, a signed 
peace treaty also indicates that the post-conflict level of hostility will be relatively low.  
Moreover, peace treaties enable international involvement in the peace process.  The presence 
of a UN mandate represents international interest in ending the conflict, in addition to 
substantial access to third party assistance and technical expertise.  The type of UN peace 
operation corresponds with an ordinal scale measuring the intensity of third party aid and 
assistance. 
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6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
A total of 8 logistic models were tested, including 4 rural population density models and 4 
percent urban population models (see Appendix C).  All of the models correctly classify 
between approximately 85% and 90% of the cases.  Model 1 correctly predicts 89.66% of the 
peacebuilding successes, which is slightly higher than the other 7 models.  Additionally, Model 1 
reduces the error in predictions by between 4.46% and 21.16% in comparison to the other 
models.  Therefore, Model 1 will be used for post-estimation analysis.  The Wald test for each 
of the models confirms that all of the independent variables combined have a significant effect 
on the probability of peacebuilding success. 
 
When the socioeconomic endowment proxies are excluded from the model, the model 
correctly classifies 86.21% of the cases, with a reduction in error of 50.01% (see Model 3 in 
Appendix D).  Therefore, the socioeconomic endowment dimension improves the percent 
correctly classified by 3.45% and the percent reduction in error by 12.51%.  Excluding the 
probability of civil war proxies, the model correctly classifies 84.62% of the cases, with a 
reduction in error of 28.02%; the probability of civil war dimension improves the percent 
correctly classified by 5.04% and the percent reduction in error by 34.50% (see Model 1 in 
Appendix D).  Moreover, when the propensity for democratization proxy is excluded, the model 
correctly classifies 88.79% of the cases, with a reduction in error of 58.06% (see Model 2 in 
Appendix D).  Therefore, the propensity for democratization dimension improves the percent 
correctly classified by 0.87% and the percent reduction in error by 4.46%. 
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HYPOTHESIS 1. State Power   
The first state power proxy, rural population density, is positive and significant in 3 out of 4 
models.  This suggests that greater rural population density corresponds with a greater degree 
of state power and therefore a greater probability of peacebuilding success.  Holding all other 
variable at central values, and with lootable resource endowment set at 1, simultaneously 
increasing rural population density from 2.623 (50th percentile) to 22.100 (99th percentile), 
decreasing its interaction with electricity consumption per capita from 0.510 (50th percentile) to 
0.025 (1st percentile), and increasing its interaction with lootable resource endowment from 0 
(50th percentile) to 6.271 (99th percentile) results in a 28.2% decrease in the probability of 
peacebuilding success.  Therefore, high rural population density in the presence of lootable 
resources is highly problematic.   
 
When lootable resource endowment and its interaction are set at 0, and all other variables are 
set at central values, simultaneously increasing rural population density from 2.623 (50th 
percentile) to 22.100 (99th percentile) and decreasing its interaction with electricity 
consumption per capita from 0.510 (50th percentile) to 0.025 (1st percentile), the probability of 
peacebuilding success increases by 33.6%.  These results indicate that in the absence of 
lootable resources, high rural population density corresponds with a 33.6% increase in the 
likelihood of peacebuilding success.   
 
Furthermore, holding all other variables at central values, simultaneously increasing rural 
population density from 0.940 (10th percentile) to 6.218 (90th percentile), decreasing electricity 
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consumption per capita from 14.943 (90th percentile) to 0.308 (10th percentile), and decreasing 
its interaction with rural population density from 12.348 (90th percentile) to 0.070 (10th 
percentile) results in a 7% decrease in the probability of peacebuilding success.  According to 
these results, high rural population density combined with low electricity consumption per 
capita corresponds with a 7% decrease in the likelihood of peacebuilding success.   
 
The second state power proxy, percent urban population, is negative and significant in all 4 
models, suggesting that larger urban populations correspond with a lower degree of state 
power.  Therefore, larger urban populations have a negative relationship with peacebuilding 
success. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2. Socioeconomic Capital   
Electricity consumption per capita, the proxy for socioeconomic development, is positive and 
significant in all of the rural population density models.  With all other variables held at central 
values, simultaneously increasing electricity consumption per capita, its interaction with rural 
population density, ethnic fractionalization, and its interaction with electricity consumption per 
capita from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile results in a 17.4% increase in the 
probability of peacebuilding success.34  Furthermore, simultaneously increasing electricity 
consumption per capita, its interaction with rural population density, ethnic fractionalization, 
its interaction with electricity consumption per capita, religious fractionalization, and its 
                                                          
34 Electricity consumption per capita increased from 0.308 to 14.943, its interaction with rural population density 
increased from 0.070 to 12.348, ethnic fractionalization increased from 0.060 to 0.877, and its interaction with 
electricity consumption per capita increased from 0.044 to 4.969. 
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interaction with electricity consumption per capita from the 10th percentile to the 90th 
percentile, while holding all other variables at central values, results in a 0.5% increase in the 
likelihood of peacebuilding success.35  These results indicate that electricity consumption per 
capita generally has a strong positive relationship with peacebuilding success unless religious 
fractionalization is high.  High religious fractionalization decreases the impact of high electricity 
consumption per capita by 16.9%.   
 
With all other variables held at central values, simultaneously increasing electricity 
consumption per capita, its interaction with rural population density, ethnic fractionalization, 
and its interaction with electricity consumption per capita from the 10th percentile to the 90th 
percentile, in addition to increasing religious fractionalization and its interaction with electricity 
consumption per capita from the 10th percentile to the 50th percentile (e.g. a moderate level of 
religious fractionalization), results in a 34.4% increase in the probability of peacebuilding 
success.36  Moreover, when electricity consumption per capita, its interaction with rural 
population density, ethnic fractionalization, its interaction with electricity consumption per 
capita, religious fractionalization, and its interaction with electricity consumption per capita are 
simultaneously increased from the 10th percentile to the 95th percentile, while all other 
variables are held at central values, the chances of peacebuilding success increases by a mere 
                                                          
35 Electricity consumption per capita increased from 0.308 to 14.943, its interaction with rural population density 
increased from 0.070 to 12.348, ethnic fractionalization increased from 0.060 to 0.877, its interaction with 
electricity consumption per capita increased from 0.044 to 4.969, religious fractionalization increased from 0.112 
to 0.680, and its interaction increased from 0.087 to 6.408. 
36 Electricity consumption per capita increased from 0.308 to 14.943, its interaction with rural population density 
increased from 0.070 to 12.348, ethnic fractionalization increased from 0.060 to 0.877, its interaction with 
electricity consumption per capita increased from 0.044 to 4.969, religious fractionalization increased from 0.112 
to 0.445, and its interaction increased from 0.087 to 0.646. 
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2.5%.37  Again, these results support the previous conclusion that electricity consumption per 
capita tends to have a strong positive relationship with peacebuilding success so long as 
religious fractionalization is not high.    
 
 For the percent urban population models, electricity consumption per capita and its interaction 
with percent urban population are both never significant; however, electricity consumption per 
capita proves to be positive while electricity consumption per capita interacted with percent 
urban population proves to be negative.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 3. Natural Resource Dependency   
Dependency on natural resource rents is negative and significant in all of the models, as is oil 
dependency.  When natural resource dependency increases from 0.023 (10th percentile) to 
0.347 (90th percentile), with all other variables held at central values, the probability of 
peacebuilding success decreases by 5.6%.  Furthermore, holding all other variables at central 
values, increasing natural resource dependency from 0.023 (10th percentile) to 0.260 (e.g. the 
level of dependency that Collier (2007) determined to be the most precarious) results in a 6.9% 
decrease in the probability of peacebuilding success.  However, when natural resource 
dependency is increased from 0.260 to 0.505 (95th percentile), with all other variables held at 
central values, the chances of peacebuilding success decreases by a mere 0.2%.  These results 
                                                          
37 Electricity consumption per capita increased from 0.308 to 24.400, its interaction with rural population density 
increased from 0.070 to 18.463, ethnic fractionalization increased from 0.060 to 0.899, its interaction with 
electricity consumption per capita increased from 0.044 to 7.394, religious fractionalization increased from 0.112 
to 0.724, and its interaction increased from 0.087 to 8.861. 
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suggest that natural resource dependency is particularly problematic up to the 0.260 threshold, 
after which, its impact becomes significantly less substantial.   
 
HYPOTHESIS 4. Diaspora Size   
Diaspora size is negative and significant in all of the models.  Holding all other variables at 
central values, and with religious dominance and its interaction both set at 0, simultaneously 
increasing Diaspora size from 0.002 (10th percentile) to 2.844 (90th percentile), increasing ethnic 
dominance from 0 to 1, and its interaction with Diaspora size from 0 to 2.844 (90th percentile) 
results in a 7.4% decrease in the probability of peacebuilding success.  Therefore, ethnic 
dominance, in the absence of religious dominance and combined with a larger Diaspora size, 
lowers the chances of peacebuilding success by 7.4%.   
 
Holding all other variables at central values, and with ethnic dominance and its interaction set 
at 0, simultaneously increasing Diaspora size from 0.002 (10th percentile) to 2.844 (90th 
percentile), increasing religious dominance from 0 to 1, and its interaction with Diaspora size 
from 0 to 2.844 (90th percentile) results in a 6% decrease in the likelihood of peacebuilding 
success.  These results suggest that religious dominance, in the absence of ethnic dominance 
and combined with a larger Diaspora size, correspond with a 6% decrease in the chances of 
peacebuilding success.   
 
When Diaspora size is increased from 0.002 (10th percentile) to 2.844 (90th percentile), with 
ethnic dominance, religious dominance, and their interactions all set at 0, and holding all other 
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variables at central values, the probability of peacebuilding success decreases by 9%.  
Therefore, larger Diaspora populations moderately decrease the probability of peacebuilding 
success. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 5. Lootable Resource Endowment   
In contrast to the predicted direction, lootable resource endowment positively correlates with 
peacebuilding success and is significant in all of the rural population density models.  With 
lootable resource endowment interacted with rural population density set at 2.557 (85th 
percentile), and with all other variables held at central values, increasing lootable resource 
endowment from 0 to 1 results in a 3.7% increase in the probability of peacebuilding success.38  
One explanation for the positive effect of lootable resource endowment could be that lootable 
resources provide substantial revenue for states so long as the state has enough power to 
protect these resources from insurgents.  Furthermore, lootable resources require little 
expertise and infrastructure, thereby making them especially useful for countries lacking in 
these capacities.     
 
HYPOTHESIS 6. Lootable Resource Endowment & Rural Population Density   
Lootable resource endowment interacted with rural population density is negative and 
significant in all 8 models.  As previously stated, high rural population density combined with 
lootable resource endowment corresponds with a 28.8% decrease in the probability of 
                                                          
38 Approximately 30% of the cases are endowed with lootable resources.  Setting lootable resource endowment 
interacted with rural population density at the 85th percentile corresponds to the mid-range for cases endowed 
with lootable resources. 
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peacebuilding success (refer to Hypothesis 1. State Power).   This suggests that larger rural 
populations with access to lootable resources create an environment less favorable to 
peacebuilding success. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 7. Ethnic & Religious Fractionalization   
Both ethnic fractionalization and religious fractionalization have mixed results.  Ethnic 
fractionalization negatively correlates with peacebuilding success, but is not significant in any of 
the models.  Similarly, religious fractionalization is also never significant, however, the direction 
of its relationship with peacebuilding success is inconsistent (e.g. negative in 3 of the 4 percent 
urban populations and positive for the other 5 models).  These results suggest that ethnic and 
religious fractionalization independently do not have a relationship with peacebuilding success. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 8. Ethnic & Religious Fractionalization & Electricity Consumption Per Capita   
Ethnic fractionalization interacted with electricity consumption per capita is not significant in 
any of the models.  Religious fractionalization interacted with electricity consumption per 
capita is negative and significant in all of the rural population density models.  Although ethnic 
fractionalization interacted with electricity consumption per capita does not show a 
relationship with peacebuilding success, religious fractionalization does prove to be 
problematic in environments with socioeconomic growth thereby decreasing the probability of 
peacebuilding success.  As previously states, the strong positive effect of high electricity 
consumption per capita on peacebuilding success can be drastically offset by high religious 
fractionalization (refer to Hypothesis 2. Socioeconomic Capital). 
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HYPOTHESIS 9. Ethnic & Religious Dominance   
Although religious dominance is never significant and does not follow the predicted direction, 
ethnic dominance is negative and significant in all of the models.  Holding all other variables at 
central values, and with Diaspora size interacted with ethnic dominance set at 0.209 (75th 
percentile), increasing ethnic dominance from 0 to 1 results in a 5.1% decrease in the likelihood 
of peacebuilding success.39  Furthermore, with Diaspora size interacted with ethnic dominance 
set at 0.209 (75th percentile), and religious dominance and its interaction both set at 0, holding 
all other variables at central values, increasing ethnic dominance from 0 to 1 results in a 3.5% 
decrease in the probability of peacebuilding success.  Therefore, ethnic dominance, in the 
absence of religious dominance and combined with moderate Diaspora size, lowers the 
likelihood of peacebuilding success by 3.5%.   
 
Holding all other variables at central values, and with Diaspora size interacted with ethnic 
dominance set at 0.209 (75th percentile), Diaspora size interacted with religious dominance set 
at 0.464 (75th percentile), and religious dominance set at 1, increasing ethnic dominance from 0 
to 1 results in a 5.1% decrease in the chances of peacebuilding success.  These results indicate 
that when ethnic dominance is combined with religious dominance and a moderate Diaspora 
size, the probability of peacebuilding success decreases by 5.1%.   
 
When ethnic dominance increases from 0 to 1, with Diaspora size set at 2.844 (90th percentile), 
its interaction with ethnic dominance set at 2.844 (90th percentile), and religious dominance 
                                                          
39 The 75th percentile was chosen because approximately 50% of the cases exhibit ethnic dominance, thereby 
making the 75th percentile around the mid-range for the cases that exhibit ethnic dominance. 
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and its interaction both set at 0, holding all other variables at central values, the probability of 
peacebuilding success decreases by 6.2%.   These results suggest that ethnic dominance, in the 
absence of religious dominance and combined with a large Diaspora size, correspond with a 
6.2% decrease in the likelihood of peacebuilding success.   
 
HYPOTHESIS 10. Ethnic Dominance, Religious Dominance & Diaspora Size   
Ethnic dominance interacted with Diaspora size does not follow the predicted direction and is 
never significant.  Similarly, Religious dominance interacted with Diaspora size is also not 
significant in any of the models, however, its coefficient alternates directions.  None of the 
models show ethnic and religious dominance interacted with Diaspora size to have a significant 
relationship with peacebuilding success. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 11. Previous Experience with Political Pluralism   
The two proxies for previous experience with political pluralism both follow the predicted 
positive direction, however, only the democracy score is significant.  The democracy score is 
positive and significant in 3 of the 4 models thereby suggesting that more experience with 
political pluralism corresponds with a greater likelihood of peacebuilding success.  Increasing 
democracy from 0.820 (50th percentile) to 16.240 (90th percentile) results in a 4.2% increase in 
the probability of peacebuilding success, with all other variables held at central values.  
Moreover, if democracy is increased from 0 to 31 (99th percentile), the likelihood of 
peacebuilding success increases by a drastic 35.2%.40  These figures indicate that democracy 
                                                          
40 Increasing democracy from 25 to 31 increases the likelihood of peacebuilding success by 0.137, or 13.7%. 
40 
 
does noticeably increase the chances of peacebuilding success and countries that reach the 99th 
percentile radically heighten their chances of peacebuilding success.   
 
HYPOTHESIS 12. Deaths & Displacements   
As predicted, greater war-related deaths and displacements negatively correlate with the 
probability of peacebuilding success and is significant in all 8 models.  Holding all other 
variables at central values, the most drastic effect of deaths and displacements occurs when 
increased from 8.385 (1st percentile) to 11.197 (10th percentile), which corresponds with a 4.6% 
decrease in the probability of peacebuilding success.  Increasing accumulated deaths and 
displacements from 11.547 (25th percentile) to 13.384 (75th percentile) decreases the likelihood 
of peacebuilding success by a mere 1.3%.  Due to large variance, the natural log of deaths and 
displacements is used in this analysis.  These results suggest that a relatively small number of 
deaths and displacements, say around 4,380 (1st percentile), has a much smaller effect on the 
probability of peacebuilding success than say around 72,911 (10th percentile).  Once a conflict 
has accumulated approximately 72,911 deaths and displacements, any additional deaths and 
displacements has a relatively small affect on the probability of peacebuilding success.   
    
HYPOTHESIS 13. War Duration   
Contradicting the predicted direction, war duration proves to be significant in all models and to 
negatively correlate with peacebuilding success.  As previously discussed, war duration could be 
argued either way.  If war duration is changed from 1.609 (10th percentile) to 5.288 (90th 
percentile) the likelihood of peacebuilding success moderately decreases by 0.035, with all 
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other variables held at central values.  These results suggest that longer wars create 
environments less favorable for peacebuilding success.  Although this could seem puzzling given 
the results of hypothesis 12, longer wars also correspond with more embedded war economies 
and longer exposure to a culture of impunity, both of which theoretically correspond with a 
lower likelihood of peacebuilding success. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 14. Identity Wars   
Identity wars proved to be negative and significant in all of the 8 models.  Holding all other 
variables at central values, ethnoreligious wars decrease the probability of peacebuilding 
success by 0.035, or 3.5%.  This suggests that ethnic and religious wars are less conducive to 
peacebuilding success. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 15. Signed Peace Treaty   
The presence of a signed peace treaty proves to be positive and significant in 3 of the 8 models 
(e.g. Models 5, 6, and 8).  The probability of peacebuilding success increases by 0.035 when a 
war has ended with a signed peace treaty, with all other variables held at central values.   
 
HYPOTHESIS 16. UN Mandate   
The presence of a UN peace operation does not prove to be significant by itself or when 
interacted with signed peace treaty. 
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New Local Capacity Indexes 
Using the results from the 8 logistic models, 8 local capacities indexes were created and tested 
(see Appendix E).  The chosen local capacities index is shown in Model 7.  All three indexes 
prove to be significant and all of the coefficients follow their expected directions.41  The model 
correctly classifies 82.91% of the cases.42  In comparison to Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) local 
capacities index (mean: 0.095; variance: 0.023), the new local capacities index has a slightly 
larger mean of 0.132 and variance of 0.031. 
 
Both of the rural population density local capacities indexes excluding the probability of 
intrastate conflict dimension prove to be significant, correctly classifying 76.27% and 78.81% of 
the cases; however, the percent urban population local capacities index excluding the 
probability of intrastate conflict dimension is insignificant (see Models 1, 2, and 3 in Appendix 
F).  Therefore, the probability of intrastate conflict dimension improves the percent correctly 
classified by 6.64% and 4.10%.  None of the local capacities indexes excluding the propensity for 
democratization dimension are significant, which suggests that propensity for democratization 
is an important dimension of the local capacities index (see Models 4 and 5 in Appendix F).  
Furthermore, the local capacities index excluding the socioeconomic endowment dimension is 
significant, correctly classifying 75.63% of the cases (see Model 6 in Appendix F).  The 
socioeconomic endowment dimension improves the percent correctly classified by 7.28%.  
These results suggest that, though excluding two of the three local capacities dimensions does 
                                                          
41 Although Model 3 has a slightly lower log pseudo-likelihood ratio (e.g. -55.988), its mean (e.g. 0.086) and 
variance (e.g. 0.016) are actually slightly lower than Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) index.  
42 Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) model correctly classifies 80.17% of the cases. 
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not make the local capacities index insignificant, including all three dimensions does prove to 
make the strongest local capacities index (e.g. with the best percentage correctly classified, 
82.91%).   
 
The purpose of the new local capacities index is to better capture the dynamics of the domestic 
realm with respect to building peace.  The new local capacities index should better depict the 
realities of the domestic post-conflict terrain thereby improving the predictability of the 
peacebuilding triangle model in addition to shedding light on the relationship between 
domestic politics and peace.  Theoretically, cases that exhibit a relatively high level of 
socioeconomic development, the sole variable of Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) local capacities 
index, while also displaying some of the negative factors that contribute to civil war onset, 
should be better represented by the new local capacities index and peacebuilding model.  This 
analysis will explore a few examples of cases that should be better captured by the new local 
capacities index in order to see if the index enhances its accuracy where expected.  
Acknowledging that these examples do not serve as in depth case studies, this analysis uses 
these examples as a basic test and nothing more. 
 
This analysis includes three civil wars in Angola between the UNITA and the government.  As a 
result of Angola’s relatively higher level of electricity consumption per capita, all three of the 
civil wars were classified by Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) as having a local capacities level 
between the 25th and 50th percentile, meaning that Angola is considered to have more 
domestic capacity for building peace than approximately 25% to 50% of the cases.  Angola has 
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an especially problematic environment for building peace because of its high natural resource 
dependency (99th percentile), significant lootable resource endowment and relatively high rural 
population density (50th percentile), and zero previous experience with political pluralism.  
Therefore, the expected new local capacities level would be considerably lower than Sambanis 
and Doyle’s (2006) local capacities index would depict.  The new local capacities index 
measures the three Angolan post-conflict environments at around the 10th percentile, meaning 
that Angola’s domestic capacity for building peace is lower than around 90% of the cases.   
Furthermore, the new local capacities index predicts the probability of peacebuilding success to 
be 15%, 34% and 34% in comparison to Sambanis and Doyle’s prediction of 22%, 43%, and 
42%.43  In this case, it seems that the new local capacities index portrays a more accurate 
depiction of the domestic capacity for building peace. 
 
Iraq is another case with a difficult post-conflict environment and a higher level of 
socioeconomic development (90th percentile).  Sambanis and Doyle (2006) measured Iraq’s 
local capacities level to be around the 90th percentile, which indicates that Iraq has greater 
domestic capacity for building peace than approximately 90% of the cases included in this 
analysis.  Iraq’s post-conflict environment is particularly problematic because of its extremely 
low rural population density (5th to 10th percentile), the presence of ethnic dominance, its 
relatively moderate Diaspora size (25th to 50th percentile), and its lack of previous experience 
with political pluralism.  Low rural population density is unfavorable to peacebuilding success 
                                                          
43 These figures are listed in chronological order, with the first war beginning in 1975 and ending in 1991, the 
second war existing between 1992 and 1994, and the final war beginning in 1997 and lasting until 2002.  
Moreover, the results of Model 3 determine the probability of peacebuilding success to be 0.17, 0.35, and 0.35. 
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because it tends to coincide with greater rural population dispersion, thereby making the 
broadcast of state power a laborious task.  Furthermore, Iraq has an incredibly high 
dependence on natural resource rents (0.273, which falls between the 75th and 90th percentiles) 
which falls closely to what Collier (2007) identifies as the most precarious level of natural 
resource dependency, 26%.  The new local capacities index predicts the probability of 
peacebuilding success to between 0.06 and 0.10, which seems more accurate in comparison to 
Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) prediction of between 0.17 and 0.23.44  
 
  
                                                          
44 The figures are listed in chronological order, with the first war existing from 1974 to 1975, the second war 
beginning in 1985 and ending in 1996, and the final war lasting from 1991 to 1993.  Furthermore, the results of 
Model 3 determine the probability of peacebuilding success to be between 0.07 and 0.12. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
All of the three dimensions – socioeconomic endowment, probability of intrastate conflict, and 
propensity for democratization – do influence the probability of building post-conflict peace.  
Under the socioeconomic endowment dimension, the two state power proxies, rural 
population density and percent urban population, proved to be both significant in their 
respective models; however, rural population density is positively correlated with 
peacebuilding success while percent urban population is negatively correlated with 
peacebuilding success.  Additionally, two of the socioeconomic endowment proxies, electricity 
consumption per capita and rural population density interacted with electricity consumption 
per capita, proved to be significant in their expected directions for the rural population density 
models.45  Several of the proxies of the probability of intrastate conflict dimension proved to be 
significant.  First, natural resource dependency and oil dependency were both negative and 
significant in their respective models.  Second, Diaspora size also proved to be negative and 
significant.  In contrast to the predicted direction, lootable resource endowment proved to be 
positive and significant in all of the models.  Nevertheless, lootable resource endowment 
interacted with rural population density proved to be negative and significant, as expected.  
These results could mean that lootable resources are only problematic when they are outside 
of the realm of state power; otherwise, lootable resource endowment actually enhances the 
prospects for building peace.  Fifth, although ethnic fractionalization and religious 
fractionalization did not prove to be significant independently, religious fractionalization 
                                                          
45 Percent urban population interacted with electricity consumption per capita did not prove to be significant in 
any of the models. 
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interacted with electricity consumption per capita did prove to be negative and significant, as 
predicted.  Sixth, ethnic dominance proved to be negative and significant.  Under the final local 
capacities dimension, propensity for democratization, the democracy score measure proved to 
be positive and significant. 
 
Several implications can be derived from the results of this analysis pertaining to the broader 
question concerning what peacebuilders can do to maximize the prospect of peace.  First, 
securing and building up the rural domain is of the utmost importance.  Whether one argues 
that low rural population density is problematic because it allows insurgents to live outside the 
realm of state power, or if one chooses to argue that low rural population density is 
problematic because it captures the inability of the rural domain to sustain populations, or 
provide populations with basic physical security, the conclusion is the same.  Peacebuilders 
should focus on building physical infrastructure – creating channels of communication and 
transportation between the rural periphery and the urban centers – in the rural hinterland.  
Second, peacebuilders can improve the prospect of peace by increasing exposure to political 
pluralism.  Moreover, for countries with considerable Diaspora, peacebuilders should focus on 
Diaspora inclusion in the peace process.  Lastly, for countries endowed with lootable resources, 
peacebuilders should focus on securing these resources from insurgent control.  In general, 
peace is unlikely when rebels have access to lucrative revenue sources and when the state is 
unable to monopolize the legitimate use of force.    
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Adding dimensions to the local capacities index does improve the overall predictability of the 
peacebuilding triangle model.  Moreover, the new local capacities index does seem to better 
portray the cases theoretically expected to be improved by the new index.  More in depth case 
study comparison is required in order to determine the precise extent to which the local 
capacities index captures the domestic capacity for peace.  This analysis shows how confining 
the domestic realm to a single measure of socioeconomic development overlooks the complex 
relationship between domestic qualities and peace.   
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Appendix A: Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) Indexes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Hostility Index Local Capacities Index International Capacities Index
war type electricity consumption per capita interaction between the type of 
UN mandate and signed peace 
treaty
log of deaths and displacements
war duration
war type per capita GDP interaction between the type of 
UN mandate and signed peace 
treaty
log of deaths and displacements rate of growth of per capita GDP net current transfers to the 
balance of payments
war duration primary commodity exports as a 
percent of GDP
number of factions
war type per capita GDP interaction between the type of 
UN mandate and signed peace 
treaty
log of deaths and displacements rate of growth of per capita GDP net current transfers to the 
balance of payments
war duration primary commodity exports as a 
percent of GDP (*different 
imputation of missing values)
index of the troops strength of 
the UN mission
Note:
Sambanis and Doyle (2006) also explored the a measure of oil exports greater than 30% of GDP as part of the local 
capacities index.
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Control Variables:
 (1) decade war started; (2) cold war conflict; (3) geographic region; (4) military personnel (in thousands, at the 
end of the war of closest year)
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics 
 
MEAN MEDIAN ST.DEV RANGE VARIANCE
war 0.659 1.000 0.475 1.000 0.225
duration* 3.536 3.761 1.417 6.169 2.010
deaths.disp* 12.392 11.913 1.317 7.059 1.734
unman 0.781 0.000 1.423 5.000 2.025
treaty 0.306 0.000 0.462 1.000 0.213
treaty.unman 0.530 0.000 1.245 5.000 1.552
cold war 0.688 1.000 0.464 1.000 0.215
army* 4.410 3.912 1.840 8.575 3.386
safrica 0.344 0.000 0.476 1.000 0.227
elect 6.069 2.200 9.827 53.770 96.584
r.density 3.989 2.623 7.330 79.377 53.736
elect.r.den 4.172 0.510 10.609 79.304 112.563
u.pop 34.270 31.378 19.894 88.620 395.772
u.pop.elect 263.426 44.356 571.170 4896.327 326236.000
nr.depend 0.164 0.113 0.186 1.011 0.034
oil.depend 0.205 0.000 0.405 1.000 0.164
loot.r.den 0.930 0.000 1.716 6.862 2.947
loot 0.311 0.000 0.464 1.000 0.215
eth.frac 0.503 0.551 0.297 0.897 0.088
rel.frac 0.410 0.445 0.211 0.782 0.044
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
 
MEAN MEDIAN ST.DEV RANGE VARIANCE
eth.dom 0.517 1.000 0.501 1.000 0.251
rel.dom 0.743 1.000 0.438 1.000 0.192
diaspora 1.047 0.121 1.317 4.933 1.736
eth.frac.elect 1.956 0.806 3.355 28.183 11.258
rel.frac.elect 1.901 0.646 3.664 28.676 13.427
diasp.e.dom 0.567 0.002 1.128 4.933 1.274
diasp.r.dom 0.672 0.023 1.180 4.933 1.393
democracy 4.837 0.820 7.228 32.100 52.253
participation 17.823 14.350 17.480 60.350 305.584
Note:  * indicates log transformation.   
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Appendix C: Logit Regression Models 
 
war
duration*
deaths.disp*
unman
treaty
treaty.unman
cold war
army*
safrica
electricity
r.density
elect.r.den
u.pop
u.pop.elect
nr.depend
oil.depend
loot.r.den
loot 
eth.frac
rel.frac
eth.dom
rel.dom
diaspora
MODEL 7. MODEL 8.
-1.401 -1.185 -1.537 -1.601 -1.631 -1.365 -1.869 -1.787
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3. MODEL 4. MODEL 5. MODEL 6.
[0.611] [0.671]
-0.567 -0.473 -0.460 -0.387 -0.580 -0.493 -0.461 -0.393
[0.527] [0.571] 0.535] [0.588] [0.576] [0.611]
[0.235] [0.219]
-0.629 -0.789 -0.626 -0.813 -0.686 -0.803 -0.665 -0.838
0.252] [0.239] [0.237] [0.209] [0.259] [0.255]
[0.354] [0.357]
-0.683 -0.463 -0.671 -0.370 -0.590 -0.365 -0.629 -0.362
[0.364] [0.377] [0.361] [0.358] [0.361] [0.365]
[0.985] [0.789]
1.206 1.370 1.140 1.311 1.467 1.592 1.327 1.371
[0.887] [0.720] [0.972] [0.777] [0.858] [0.632]
[0.909] [0.820]
1.860 1.541 1.748 1.345 1.754 1.413 1.686 1.330
[0.838] [0.867] [0.873] [0.846] [0.810] [0.833]
[1.365] [1.124]
0.307 0.145 -0.335 -0.586 0.827 0.383 0.117 -0.313
[1.324] [1.120] [1.347] [1.096] [1.294] [1.023]
[0.769] [0.776]
0.081 0.275 -0.078 0.128 0.009 0.232 -0.193 0.042
[0.962] [0.839] [0.886] [0.827] [0.972] [0.809]
[0.296] [0.265]
-0.367 -0.445 -0.556 -0.570 -0.699 -0.712 -1.118 -1.054
[0.389] 0.408] [0.334] [0.292] [0.335] [0.354]
[1.114] [1.119]
0.345 0.365 0.274 0.237 0.330 0.334 0.229 0.210
[0.971] [1.001] [1.067] [1.062] [1.011] [1.059]
[0.177] [0.161]
0.152 0.210 0.233 0.248
[0.126] [0.106] [0.176] [0.149] [0.132] [0.116]
-0.116 -0.086 -0.109 -0.077
[0.128] [0.089] [0.109] [0.077]
-0.033 -0.045 -0.037 -0.046
[0.048] [0.033] [0.051] [0.030]
[0.019] [0.018]
-0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
[0.018] [0.018]
[0.001] [0.001]
-13.071 -12.462 -13.907 -13.205
[0.001] [0.001]
[3.839]
-3.229 -2.637 -3.290 -2.708
[3.809] [3.505] [4.636]
[0.593]
-1.100 -1.200 -0.582 -0.674 -1.035 -1.091 -0.458 -0.540
[0.711] [0.652] [0.708]
[0.226] [0.245]
2.565 2.639 0.930 1.068 2.270 2.296 0.423 0.618
[0.234] [0.304] [0.241] [0.286] [0.233] [0.269]
[1.070] [0.996]
-1.069 -1.808 -0.407 -1.331 -0.624 -1.359 -0.013 -0.913
[1.248] [1.005] [1.155] [1.039] [1.227] [1.126]
[1.812] [2.144]
1.890 1.488 -0.008 -0.762 2.034 1.374 0.460 -0.514
[1.992] [1.979] [1.958] [2.246] [1.738] [1.904]
[3.068] [3.276]
-1.767 -2.004 -1.829 -2.058 -1.936 -1.951 -1.871 -1.950
[3.914] [3.666] [3.679] [3.743] [3.452] [3.217]
[0.903] [0.980]
0.412 0.729 0.806 0.991 0.207 0.616 0.606 0.868
[0.958] [0.966] [0.958] [1.020] [0.976] [0.978]
[0.801] [0.715]
-1.351 -1.279 -0.981 -0.996 -1.647 -1.438 -1.287 -1.206
[0.735] [0.632] [0.803] [0.694] [0.708] [0.596]
[0.545] [0.517][0.692] [0.589] [0.573] [0.551] [0.775] [0.624]
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Appendix C: Logit Regression Models (continued) 
 
e.frac.elect
r.frac.elect
diasp.e.dom
diasp.r.dom
democracy
participation
constant
N 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116
Pseudo-R2 0.530 0.520 0.500 0.491 0.492 0.473 0.461 0.444
P-Log-L -32.974 -33.651 -35.036 -35.693 -35.614 -36.928 -37.805 -38.970
% CC 89.66 88.79 88.79 88.79 87.07 86.21 87.93 85.34
% ROE 62.52 58.06 54.55 53.34 58.06 58.06 46.69 41.36
1.086
[0.447]
[1.158] [1.028]
[0.410]
[0.768] [1.059]
[0.308]
[0.956]
0.516 0.895 0.391 0.511
0.077 -0.319
[1.009] [1.210] [0.798] [0.879] [0.935] [1.141] [0.698] [0.804]
0.451 0.131 -0.262 -0.514 0.789 0.301
[0.076] [0.075] [0.053] [0.059]
0.136 0.113 0.158 0.141
0.033 0.021
[0.022] [0.021] [0.020] [0.022]
0.025 0.013
[5.171] [5.576] [5.304]
9.529 9.506 11.803 13.357 10.018 9.720
Reported: coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses); estimates in bold are significant at least at the 0.05 level 
with two-tailed test; estimates in italics are significant at the 0.10 level; * indicates log transformation.
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3. MODEL 4. MODEL 5. MODEL 6. MODEL 7. MODEL 8.
12.655 13.959
[5.591] [5.631] [5.539] [5.202] [5.600]
0.328 0.189 0.3610.217 0.258 0.406
[0.799][0.950] [1.102]
0.399 1.111 0.832
-0.939
[0.355] [0.332] [0.342]
-0.373-0.907 -0.645-0.614 -0.729 -0.729 -0.374
[0.400] [0.375] [0.393] [0.318] [0.330]
0.264 0.222
[0.244] [0.395] [0.375] [0.386] [0.386]
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Appendix D: Individual Dimension Logit Regression Models 
 
war
duration*
deaths.disp*
unman
treaty
treaty.unman
cold war
army*
safrica
elect
r.density
elect.r.den
nr.depend
loot.r.den
loot
eth.frac
rel.frac
eth.dom
rel.dom
diaspora
[1.090]
-1.499
[2.039]
-0.157
[3.505]
-1.881
[1.305]
-0.509
[1.739]
0.913
[3.343]
-1.830
[0.970]
0.340
[0.713]
-1.320
[0.640]
-0.590
[0.220]
1.147
-0.126
[0.341]
-0.264
-13.697
[3.321]
[0.287]
-0.407
[0.624]
1.027
[0.798]
1.386
MODEL 3.
-1.612
[0.561]
-0.423
[0.240]
-0.529
[0.880]
-0.100
[0.842]
[0.039]
-12.205
[3.284]
-0.979
[0.220]
2.228
[0.968]
0.316
[0.129]
0.294
[0.089]
-0.094
-0.006
[0.355]
-0.284
[0.941]
[0.953]
0.311
[0.709]
-1.520
[0.664]
[0.382]
-0.527
[0.788]
1.517
[0.816]
1.730
[1.239]
0.764
[0.980]
MODEL 2.
-1.626
[0.553]
-0.611
[0.255]
-0.706
-0.039
[0.014]
[0.038]
0.073
[0.064]
MODEL 1.
-1.309
[0.477]
-0.292
[0.186]
0.812
[0.666]
0.671
[0.669]
0.096
[0.167]
-0.673
[0.277]
-0.104
[0.496]
0.981
[0.753]
0.288
[0.744]
0.101
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Appendix D: Individual Dimension Logit Regression Models (continued) 
 
eth.frac.elect
rel.frac.elect
diasp.e.dom
diasp.r.dom
democracy
constant
N 117 116 116
Pseudo-R2 0.253 0.516 0.459
Wald Statistic 26.450 114.030 89.190
P-Log-L -53.349 -33.963 -37.943
%CC 84.62 88.79 86.21
%ROE 28.02 58.06 50.01
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
0.418 0.534
[0.376] [0.398]
-0.651 -0.385
[0.379] [0.316]
0.367 0.779
[0.821] [1.005]
0.677 0.125
[0.907] [0.841]
0.051 0.137
Reported: coefficents and robust standard errors (in 
parantheses); estimates in bold are significant at least at the 
0.05 level with two-tailed test; estimates in italics are 
significant at the 0.10 level; * indicates log transformation.
[3.754] [6.039] [4.725]
[0.038] [0.054]
6.657 10.437 10.924
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Appendix E: Index Logit Regression Models 
 
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3. MODEL 4. MODEL 5. MODEL 6. MODEL 7. MODEL 8.
hostility -3.795 -4.082 -3.881 -4.096 -3.985 -4.061 -4.279 -4.167
[1.274] [1.263] [1.283] [1.263] [1.253] [1.273] [1.290] [1.250]
local 1. 0.430
[0.227]
local 2. 0.058
[0.036]
local 3. 0.870
[0.368]
local 4. 0.046
[0.028]
local 5. 0.278
[0.335]
local 6. 0.280
[0.238]
local 7. 1.059
[0.462]
local 8. 0.503
[0.379]
international 2.931 2.904 3.105 2.908 2.802 2.848 3.087 2.964
[0.980] [1.008] [0.955] [1.004] [0.970] [0.978] [0.961] [0.953]
_con 0.238 0.702 0.064 0.732 0.580 0.582 0.335 0.554
[0.637] [0.586] [0.600] [0.581] [0.606] [0.606] [0.577] [0.582]
N 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117
Pseudo-R2 0.157 0.138 0.215 0.140 0.132 0.138 0.201 0.170
Wald Statistic 16.59 14.81 19.64 14.92 14.62 14.68 17.51 16.79
P-Log-L -60.141 -61.482 -55.988 -61.357 -61.91 -61.512 -57.004 -59.202
% CC 76.92 78.63 80.34 79.49 78.63 78.63 82.91 82.05
Reported: coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses); bold indicates significance at least at the 0.05 
level with two-tailed test; italics indicates signficance at the 0.10 level.
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Appendix F: Index Individual Dimension Logit Regression Models 
 
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3. MODEL 4. MODEL 5. MODEL 6.
hostility -3.781 -3.831 -4.035 -3.819 -3.896 -3.454
[1.236] [1.218] [1.230] [1.228] [1.228] [1.290]
local 1. 7.131
[2.057]
local 2. 6.37
[2.118]
local 3. 3.548
[2.518]
local 4. 1.337
[1.281]
local 5. 0.393
[0.732]
local 6. 5.377
[2.934]
international 2.782 2.865 2.929 2.797 2.756 2.407
[1.008] [0.991] [0.960] [0.973] [0.967] [0.933]
_con 0.473 0.507 0.493 0.527 0.707 0.257
[0.551] [0.543] [0.584] [0.616] [0.595] [0.634]
N 118 118 119 117 117 119
Pseudo-R2 0.166 0.166 0.152 0.133 0.126 0.139
Wald Statistic 18.23 18.39 15.89 15.73 14.84 12.96
P-Log-L -60.534 -60.509 -61.822 -61.827 -62.366 -62.797
%CC 76.27 78.81 80.67 76.07 76.07 75.63
Reported: coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses); bold indicates significance at 
least at the 0.05 level with two-tailed test; italics indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
 
